Connectionist models contrast in many ways with the symbolic models that have traditionally been applied within social psychology. In this article the authors apply an autoassociative connectionist model originally developed by J. L. to reproduce several well-replicated and theoretically important phenomena related to person perception and stereotyping. These phenomena are exemplar-based inference, group-based stereotyping, the simultaneous application of several stereotypes to generate emergent characteristics, and the effects of recency and frequency of prior exposures on accessibility (the probability of a representation's use). Though many of these phenomena are explained by current theories in social psychology, the simulation contributes to parsimony and theoretical integration by showing that a single, very simple mechanism can generate them all. The model also predicts a new phenomenon--rapid recovery of accessibility after it has declined to zero.
SMITH AND DECOSTER Churchland and Sejnowski (1992) . E. R. Smith (1996) offered a brief overview for social psychologists. Though connectionist models, like symbolic models, are quite diverse, most share features like these:
Structure: All representation and processing are performed by a set of simple and richly interconnected units, idealized neurons. These units receive excitatory and inhibitory inputs across weighted connections from other units, sum those inputs to determine their own activation, and send the resulting output to other units.
Representation: A concept or object is represented not by a single unit but by a pattern of activation distributed across a set of processing units. Activation levels can change rapidly, and the current activation pattern is identified with a transitory mental state.
Learning:
The weights on the connections between units are changed by a learning process. As input patterns set up activation flows through the network, learning rules update the connection weights in a way that facilitates future processing of the same and similar patterns. Because the weights on connections are assumed to change only slowly, they are the repository of the network's long-term memory.
Unity of representation and process:
Representations are not static entities that are "stored" inertly until retrieved by a search process and used. Instead, a single mechanism, the flow of activation along connections between units, accounts for both storage and processing of information.
Retrieval and accessibility:
Retrieval is the reinstatement of a previously processed activation pattern, elicited by the current inputs. Patterns are not stored anywhere, but the ability to reinstate them depends on the changes in connection weights that took place when the pattern was originally processed. Learning occurs incrementally after each pattern is processed. Therefore, the principle of accessibility is inherent to the network's operation, for a pattern that has recently or frequently been encountered will be reinstated more readily than other patterns.
A Recurrent Connectionist Model of Learning and
Memory Use
The connectionist model applied in this article was developed by . An overview of the model is given here, with specific details reserved for the Method section. The model is portrayed in Figure 1 . Each unit both receives input from the environment and produces signals that are the network's output. A pattern of activation over all of the units, representing an input stimulus, enters the network and initiates processing. Activation flows over the connections between the units and after some time settles into a stable output pattern. This is a recurrent network, which means that units send activation to each other and are able to exert reciprocal influences (in contrast to a feedforward network in which activation flows unidirectionally from input to output). In recurrent networks, flows of activation set up by the presentation of an input pattern may show various forms of dynamic behavior, including periodic oscillation, chaotic behavior, or--the behavior typical of the McClelland and Rumelhart network--settling to a fixed final state.
In this network, the equations governing activation flow and learning produce particularly useful forms of behavior, which can be conceptualized as pattern learning and retrieval. As it Figure 1 . A recurrent connectionist module. Each unit (represented by a circle) receives input from outside the network (the arrows coming up from the bottom of the drawing) and produces output (the arrows rising to the top). In addition, each unit sends its output signal to every other unit (the two connections between each pair of units are shown as a double-headed arrow in the figure for clarity).
processes a number of input patterns, the network in effect learns about relationships among activation values of different units in the inputs it sees. The network can then use those learned expectations to fill in values in patterns that it encounters later. Obviously if input patterns were structureless and random, without any constraints or predictability across the pattern elements, there would be no useful relationships for the network to extract. However, if the input has structure, the network can learn it. Certainly social information typically has structure that can be exploited in this way; for example, people who are warm are also usually friendly and smiling. After learning, if a new input contains part but not all of a known pattern, flows of activation within the network will reconstruct the remaining portions of the pattern. We could say that the network has learned expectations about regularities in its inputs and can use that knowledge--in addition to the actual input pattern--to make inferences.
We propose that this type of connectionist network may account for certain phenomena within social psychology, particularly those involved in preconscious conceptual interpretation. In many current theories in social cognition this is termed schematic processing. The inputs to this module may come either from relatively unprocessed sensory inputs or from other modules that perform prior processing (see McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986, p. 174) . The patterns output by this module, presumably after much additional processing in other modules, help constitute the individual's conscious experience. A module of this sort needs to be supplemented in several ways to form a complete theory of the human social-cognitive system; we return to this point later in the article. This model is intended only as an account of the learning and processing mechanisms that underlie preconscious schematic processes. This still includes many diverse phenomena, including schema learning and application, schema combination, and accessibility. In recent years, social cognition theorists have heavily emphasized automatic and preconscious processes of the sort that we intend this model PERSON MEMORY SIMULATIONS 23 to capture (see Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Bargh, 1994; Higgins, 1996) .
Computer Simulation as a Research Strategy in Social Psychology
The goal of computer simulation is to determine whether a particular explicitly specified theoretical model can account for a target set of empirical results. In this article, we focus on simulating several known results (listed below). What is the potential value of this enterprise?
1. At a minimum, simulation might be able to show that a novel theoretical mechanism can account for a finding that already has a known and accepted theoretical explanation. This represents a theoretical contribution, showing that an alternative explanation may be viable. Such a contribution could prove valuable in spurring further empirical research, as it raises the obvious question of which mechanism accounts for the phenomenon under what circumstances. An example is E. R. Smith's ( 1991 ) simulation demonstrating that a novel exemplar-memory mechanism could account for aspects of "illusory correlation," which had previously been assumed to result from other mechanisms (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) . Further research, such as McConnell, Sherman, and Hamilton (1994) , proceeded to test competing predictions of the models about circumstances under which the illusory correlation effect might occur.
2. Simulations might show that a single mechanism can account for several known phenomena that previously commanded separate explanations. This is a contribution to parsimony, a valued goal of scientific explanation, to the extent that a single assumed mechanism can do the work that was previously believed to require many distinct mechanisms. More important, it contributes to theoretical integration. If multiple empirical phenomena can be shown to follow from a single theoretical mechanism, understanding of each phenomenon may benefit from previously unrecognized parallels with the others.
3. A new mechanism, after acquiring some initial credibility by demonstrations of consistency with existing observations, might also be shown to make new predictions. Empirical confirmation of such predictions would constitute strong evidence for the new mechanism.
In this article, we take all three of these steps: We show that several types of known findings and also some important and novel, though currently untested, predictions follow from our model.
Target Phenomena for These Simulations
Computer simulations can be conducted in two different ways. For one, the investigator can select a single crucial experiment or several closely related experiments, usually incorporating many conditions, and try to simulate the empirical data patterns in precise quantitative detail. An example appears in McClelland and Rumelhart (1986, pp. 200-204) . This approach can be valuable if a single experiment exists that captures (perhaps in different conditions) all the processes of interest to the model and if the limitations on generality that are inherent to any single study or research paradigm are accepted.
We take the alternative approach: We select robust and wellreplicated data patterns from literature and use the simulation to reproduce qualitatively these findings (as in E.R. Smith, 1991 ) . McClelland and Rumelhart (1986, pp. 194-199) also took this approach as part of their original investigation of the properties of this network. This approach has the advantage of generality: If successful, it means that the simulation captures what are consensually regarded as major themes in the empirical literature rather than the specific quantitative results of a single experiment. In addition, no one study (to our knowledge) adequately represents all of the processes we want to simulate, particularly the learning as well as the use of social knowledge structures.
To support our claims about the major data patterns in the literature, formal meta-analyses would be desirable in principle. However, conducting several meta-analyses would carry the reader far beyond the scope of this article. Our intent is to focus on relatively uncontroversial generalizations that are widely represented in textbooks and reviews (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Wyer & Srull, 1994) . In the following descriptions and throughout this article, we often use the term trait for brevity, but the model applies equally to personality traits, typical behaviors, physical characteristics, and other types of characteristics that are part of person impressions (Carlston, 1994) . We target the following phenomena.
1. People can learn the idiosyncratic characteristics of a specific well-known person; they can apply this knowledge to make inferences about unobserved traits of a new exemplar (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Lewicki, 1985) .
2. People can learn a group stereotype or specific pattern of traits from exposure to members of a group; they can apply this knowledge to make inferences about unobserved traits of a new exemplar of the group .
3. People can simultaneously learn multiple knowledge structures; they can apply them in combination to infer new, emergent characteristics of a new exemplar that combines features of several existing categories (Hastie, Schroeder, & Weber, 1990; Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990) .
4. Recently or frequently encountered patterns will have a bigger impact on future inferences; this is the principle of accessibility (Higgins, 1996) .
Our goal in this article is to demonstrate that a single (and simple) mechanism can reproduce all of these findings. Each of these has an existing explanation in the literature--but the explanations are all distinct. Bringing the phenomena under a common theoretical umbrella not only increases parsimony but also yields a deeper understanding of these findings as seemingly distinct outcroppings of a common set of underlying processes. Later in the article we also demonstrate that the same model makes intriguing new predictions as well as reproducing known findings.
Overview of Autoassociative Model

Distributed Representations
The model we apply here, an autoassociative memory, is a type of connectionist network that can learn to reconstruct information about a number of distinct stimuli. The network uses distributed representations, in which each stimulus is encoded 24 SMITH AND DECOSTER as a pattern of activation across a common set of units (Thorpe, 1995; Touretzky, 1995) . This is one of the greatest differences between connectionist networks and the associative networks that have typically been used in social cognition models of person perception (Hamilton et al., 1980; Hastie, 1988) . The latter models rely on local representations, in which each semantically meaningful item stored in memory is represented by its own unit. In a distributed representation, however, a stimulus or concept is identified with a pattern of activation across all of the units. Consequently, units are not specifically associated with particular stimuli or concepts. They are not assumed to have any meaningful semantic interpretation. However, we do assume that semantically similar concepts are represented by similar patterns of activation across the units (Clark, 1993) .
Models using local representations (one unit per concept or proposition) can reproduce some social psychological phenomena (Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993) . However, we see several advantages of distributed over local representations. Generalization of learning across similar concepts is a direct consequence of distributed representations. As we discuss later, learning occurs at the unit level rather than at the level of meaningful stimuli or concepts. Because similar concepts are assumed to have similar representations, learning something about one concept will influence how the network processes related concepts. It is also much easier to incorporate new concepts into a network that uses distributed representations than into one that uses localized representations. In a localist network, each concept must be represented by its own unit. This means that the network itself must grow larger each time it encounters a new concept, and difficult decisions must occasionally be made as to when an input represents an instance of an existing concept versus when a new unit must be created. In a distributed network, on the other hand, the model represents every possible concept on the same units. Novel concepts induce new patterns of activity across the network, but the network's structure stays the same. More thorough discussions of distributed representations may be found in Rumelhart (1986), van Gelder ( 1991 ) , and Thorpe (1995) .
Learning and Processing in Autoassociative Networks
Autoassociative networks operate by processing input information in a way that depends on their past learning. Through training, an autoassociator learns predictive relationships among features of the inputs, and it uses this knowledge (represented in the connection weights) as it processes new stimuli. For example, a trained autoassociator exposed to an incomplete version of a stimulus pattern that it has previously processed will use what it has learned to fill in missing information. This process can be viewed as a type of assimilation: Past experiences affect processing of the current input cues, to the extent that they are similar to those cues.
Consider as an example an autoassociative network designed to store information about people. Let us say that the network observes patterns of activation representing several people, each of whom is perceived as hostile and narrow minded. That is, the overall patterns representing these individuals each include subpatterns representing the concepts of hostility and narrow mindedness. The network will alter its connection strengths to represent these observed relationships. If a new input pattern representing a hostile person is now encountered, the pattern of units corresponding to "narrow minded" will likely be activated as well, representing an inference.
The learning process that underlies this behavior is fairly simple. Each unit in the network receives direct input from the environment as well as both sending and receiving connections to every other unit (see Figure 1 ) . The goal is for the network to "remember" how each unit's external input has generally been associated with the activation of other units so that the network can reconstruct a known pattern when it receives incomplete inputs. To accomplish this, the weights must be set during learning so that units that are generally concurrently active excite each other, those that tend to be active at different times inhibit each other; whereas those units in which the activations are uncorrelated show neither mutual activation nor inhibition. Researchers have developed several different learning rules to accomplish this (Hebb, 1949; . For example, a simple learning rule is to increase the weight of the connection between two units whenever the network observes a pattern in which both units are active at the same time and to decrease it whenever the network observes a pattern in which one is active and the other is not. In this way, the sign and magnitude of each connection weight come to reflect regularities in the patterns encountered by the network. The learning process can be viewed as a type of accommodation, in which the network's stored knowledge is subtly modified and tuned by the actual external input.
Once the learning process has modified the connections in this way, an autoassociator can combine input information with information derived from past experiences. If a stimulus is somehow incongruent with its past training, a trained autoassociator will modify the output pattem so that it better matches its prior experiences. For example, assume that the person network described earlier is trained on a number of descriptions of hostile, narrow-minded individuals. If the network is then given a pattem representing a person who is hostile but with no information about other attributes, it will use its knowledge to fill in a pattern representing the inference that the person is also narrow minded. In addition, if the network receives a pattern indicating a person who is hostile and broad minded, it may report (depending on the details of the current stimulus and its learning history) either that the person is not hostile or that he or she is likely narrow minded rather than broad minded. This occurs because the internal flows of activation within the network as well as the external inputs affect the final activation pattern. Thus, the network can use its experience to correct for possible perceptual errors as well as to fill in unobserved details.
The network carries out these functions without constructing or storing discrete representations of specific types of expected stimuli (Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986) . All representations are stored together in the connection weights in the network, and all representations simultaneously influence the processing of new inputs (for all processing depends on those same weights). These assumptions contrast with those of traditional models, in which general processes construct, search for, retrieve, and use discretely stored representations (see E. R. Smith, 1998) .
In summary, autoassociative networks possess many of the features we believe are part of human memory. Autoassociators provide for memory storage and retrieval, they can learn simply by observing examples, they automatically generalize their knowledge across similar experiences, they store information by using a finite amount of resources, and they use distributed representations.
Specific Aspects of the Autoassociator
We used the autoassociative model discussed in McClelland and for our simulations, in the implementation provided in the Stuttgart Neural Network Simulator I (Zell et al., 1994) . The simulated network has 40 units, interconnected as shown in Figure 1 . The number 40 was an arbitrary choice, mainly reflecting the limits of our available computational resources. In keeping with the fundamental representational assumption of distributed connectionist models, a person, social group, or other social object is represented by a pattern of activation across these units.
In this model, processing a stimulus occurs in two phases. During the first phase, the units receive activation from external sources. Because the units are linked, activation then flows within the network so that each unit influences others. The final pattern of activation will depend not only on the external stimulus but also on the internal state of the network (the strengths of the interunit connections, which depend on the network's learning history). Although theoretically this process occurs in continuous time, the computer simulates it as a series of discrete time steps. At first, the activation of units in the network will change significantly during each step. While the inputs are held constant, however, the unit activations will vary less and less and will eventually converge to a particular pattern that represents the network's output. This could be interpreted as its "impression" of the current stimulus.
In the second phase that follows, the connection weights are modified according to the learning rule, on the basis of the final pattern of activation. This in effect lets the network remember something about its final impression, which will in turn influence the way future inputs are processed.
Mathematically, every unit i in the network receives internal input inti. This is the sum of activation flowing to i along the connections from all other units in the network. The input to unit i from unit j is the product of j's activation aj and the weight w 0 of the link from unit j to unit i:
As these equations show, units for which the total input is positive tend to increase their activation, whereas those that receive a net negative input will tend to decrease their activation. The second term in the equations, subtracting a constant times the unit activation, causes the activation to decay naturally toward zero. Units with larger activation magnitudes experience greater decay. E and D are global parameters that set the rates of excitation and decay. In our simulations, both of these parameters were fixed at .15. The terms (1 -a~) and (al + 1) make it more difficult to further activate units that have activations close to + 1 and more difficult to reduce the activation of units that have activations close to -1. The equations also constrain the activations to the range of -1 to + 1. The network is allowed to propagate its activation for 50 processing cycles, which in our simulations is enough to develop a stable interpretation of the input.
The autoassociator next enters the learning phase, in which it modifies its weights so that the network better represents the observed stimulus. First, the network determines the fit between each unit's internal input and the stimulus pattern. We want the network to modify the connection weights so that the summed internal input for each unit predicts the external input as well as possible, in order for the network to be able to reconstruct a known pattern from incomplete or erroneous inputs. The error in this prediction is simply the difference between the internal and external inputs for each unit:
If this error 6~ is positive, it means that unit i is not receiving enough internal input. To increase the amount of internal input received by a unit it is necessary to increase the weights to this unit from other units that have positive activation and to decrease the weights to this unit from other units that have negative activation. Conversely, if the error is negative, it means that the unit is receiving too much internal input, so the weights would be changed in the opposite direction to reduce the total internal input. These conditions are met by changing the weights according to the following formula: int/ = Zj(aj.wij). Awij = ~7" 6i" aj, Units have no links to themselves; all wii = 0. The activation of a unit can range from -1 to 1, and the connection weight can be any real value. If the product of the unit j's activation and thej -i connection weight is positive, it represents an excitatory influence on unit i; if negative, an inhibitory influence. The total input Ni for a unit i is the sum of its internal input and the external input extl it receives directly from the stimulus pattern:
where ~ is a global parameter that determines how fast the network learns (fixed at a value of .01 in our simulation runs; see McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988, p. 182) , This method of altering the weights, called the delta rule, will move the weights toward values that make the internal input approximate the external input for each unit. When these match, internal flows of activation will allow the network to reinstantiate a known input pattern even if the input is incomplete. This learning will also
The change in activation for unit i during a processing cycle is ~ This simulator runs on a wide range of UNIX systems and is availdetermined by the following equations: able at URL ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-stuttgart.de/pub/SNNS.
influence the interpretation of future inputs to the extent that they are similar to the observed stimulus pattern. In summary, a network acting according to these processing and learning equations can show several types of behavior that seem familiar. It can store patterns that it processes, or it can abstract an average or summary of a number of similar patterns because their similarities will produce mutually reinforcing weight changes, whereas random differences will produce weight changes that cancel out. The network can then retrieve a stored pattern or summary by reinstating it on the outputs, given an appropriate set of input cues. The network does all of these things without any explicit processes of summarizing or averaging input information, constructing representations and storing them as discrete entities, searching among the stored representations, or selecting one to be retrieved and used. These ideas are so familiar as metaphors for memory that it is very difficult to think of memory as something other than a warehouse filled with separate representations that people search for and retrieve. Yet the functions these metaphorical terms describe can be performed by mechanisms that involve flows of activation among simple interconnected units (E. R. Smith, 1998) .
General Simulation Approach
We designed our simulations to capture the conceptual features of the empirical phenomena as much as possible. Research participants enter a typical person memory experiment with a store of background knowledge (such as group stereotypes). In the experiment itself, they may be exposed to some social stimuli and then report their memory or judgments concerning those stimuli. Therefore, for each simulated topic we built a set of stimulus patterns to represent (a) the participant's preexperimental knowledge as well as any learning that takes place in the experiment and (b) the test stimuli used to elicit memory reports or social judgments. We had an autoassociative network learn the patterns (a) and then presented the test stimuli (b) and recorded the network's output for each. The specific characteristics of each stimulus set were chosen to reproduce conceptually the experiences of the human participants in the experimental paradigm we were trying to simulate, as discussed later for each simulated topic. Note that we do not model background knowledge directly, but the process of learning it. That is, we do not start with the assumption that people enter a situation possessing specific knowledge structures with specific levels of accessibility, but we assume that those knowledge structures stem from a history of past exposure to and use of specific stimuli.
In real life, people cannot neatly define those that they meet as possessing specific quantities of individual traits or other characteristics. Situational variables as well as our internal states can influence the way we perceive others. Our perceptions, therefore, vary with the presence or absence of these factors. If we wish to generalize from our model to human behavior we should show that the model reproduces known data patterns not only when stimuli are clear and error free but also when variability is included in the stimuli. We therefore added some element of noise, quantitative random variation, to all of our stimulus patterns. The inclusion of random variation means that we cannot run the simulation program a single time and declare that its output represents the prediction of the model. To make confident statements about the model's predictions we must average over the results of several independent simulation runs, each with a new set of stimuli that satisfies the constraints for the experiment but has new random values added. The simulation output from each such stimulus set corresponds conceptually to the responses of an individual research participant in a standard experiment. Correspondingly, we applied standard statistical techniques, such as t tests and correlations, to analyze the simulation results for assurance that the patterns we report go beyond chance fluctuations.
Simulation 1: Exemplar-Based Inference Inferences concerning a target person can be based on the perceived characteristics of a specific well-known individual (E. R. Smith & Z~ate, 1992) . Research by Andersen and her colleagues (e.g., Andersen & Cole, 1990) and by Lewicki (1985) has shown that exemplar-based knowledge can affect inferences about newly encountered persons who resemble the known exemplars in some way.
Method
We simulated 10 subjects and exposed each to 1,200 patterns. (Here and in the other simulations we report, this total number of patterns is an arbitrary choice.) One thousand were used to represent general background knowledge about people and had all of their pattern values drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of .5 (henceforth to be written as N[xx, yy] to indicate a normal distribution with mean xx and standard deviation yy).2 The other 200 patterns were copies of a single exemplar, in which the values were randomly drawn from a N[0, .5 ] distribution. These copies of the exemplar were presented without variation. The presentation order of these 1,200 patterns was determined randomly for each subject. We presented the background patterns (not just the copies of the specific exemplar) because it would not be very exciting or interesting if a network that had encountered nothing but copies of the single exemplar was found to be able to reproduce that pattern as its output.
We tested the network's memory for the exemplar by presenting it with an incomplete version of the exemplar--representing a new individual who resembles the known exemplar. This test pattern had 35 of the original exemplar's values. We then correlated the values instantiated by the network's output on the 5 nonpresented characteristics with the corresponding values from the original exemplar. Again, the decision to present 35 of 40 input pattern elements and look at the network's output on the other 5 was arbitrary.
Results
The mean correlation between the instantiated values and the original exemplar characteristics was .828. This was a significant correlation, t(9) = 26.37, p < .0001.
Discussion
This simulation shows that the network can learn a pattern from multiple presentations. Through the learning process, the connections between units come to hold information about the specific repeatedly encountered exemplar. When a new input pattern is similar to the learned one, the network uses its stored knowledge to fill in unobserved parts of the pattern. Conceptually, this process resembles exemplar-based inference in person perception (e.g., Andersen & Cole, 1990 ).
Simulation 2: Group-Based Stereotyping A stereotype is defined as a representation of attributes associated with a particular group membership, learned through experience with individual group members or from social learning. The stereotype affects inferences about new group members. Stereotyping research (see has typically examined stereotype content and representation, as well as the processes involved in the application of stereotypes in person perception. Our simulation broadens the focus to include the process by which a stereotype is learned, as well as representation and use.
In common with other exemplar-based models of stereotype acquisition (e.g., E. R. Smith & Z~irate, 1992) , we assume that stereotypes form when perceivers encounter a number of group members possessing specific characteristics that are perceived to differ from "the average person." These encounters, of course, need not reflect everyday interactions with real people but can stem from portrayals of group members in the media or in stories, jokes, or descriptions provided by others. Thus, this model (like other exemplar models of stereotyping) is not committed to a "grain-of-truth" theory about the origin of stereotypes (though it is certainly consistent with that viewpoint).
Nor does an exemplar model necessarily predict that people will lack stereotypes about groups they have never personally encountered. Biased and stereotypic media portrayals, or social learning from others, can allow the individual to construct mental representations of group members that are predominantly consistent with cultural stereotypes.
Me~od
We simulated 10 subjects and exposed each to 1,200 patterns. One thousand were used to represent general background knowledge about people and had all of their characteristics distributed N[0, .5]. The remaining 200 were constructed to represent some members of a particular group who have distinctive subpatterns, including positive mean values on 6 particular units and negative values on 6 other units. (As before, the use of 6 characteristics was arbitrary.) These 200 patterns had 6 characteristics distributed N[.5, .5 ], 6 characteristics distributed N[ -.5, .5 ], and the remaining 28 characteristics distributed N[0, .5 ]. The presentation order of all 1,200 patterns was determined randomly for each subject. Note that we do not include a single attribute representing group membership per se, but we assume that parts of the distributed pattern represent attributes (such as aspects of physical appearance) that are cues to group membership, whereas other parts represent characteristics (such as traits) that are perceived to be correlated with group membership.
After exposure to these patterns, we tested the network's use of the stereotype by presenting it with an incomplete version of the stereotype pattern, containing just 7 of the 12 relevant units (with the other 33 units set to zero) to see if it would infer the group-typical values for the 5 missing units.
Results
The activation values across the five nonpresented units were correlated with the known-group average values (either .5 or -.5 for each characteristic). The value of this correlation, averaged across the 10 simulated subjects, was .647, which is reliably different from zero, t(9) = 10.54, p < .0001. Thus, the network filled in group-typical values for a new individual who had some features that defined him or her as a member of the stereotyped group.
Discussion
This simulation shows that the network learning rule, which extracts information from input patterns and represents it as patterns of connection weights, can reproduce stereotyping effects. Nonzero connections among units included in subpatterns representing the group-typical attributes give rise to inferences about new group members. The difference between this simulation and the previous one (exemplar-based inference) is that in this case the average or typical pattern was abstracted from many group members, which incorporated some variability; whereas in the previous case the pattern was learned from multiple.presentations of an unchanged exemplar.
McClelland and Rumelhart (1986) provided similar demonstrations, showing that a network of the sort simulated here can simultaneously extract several prototype patterns from the presentation of noisy exemplars and then reproduce the prototypes from appropriate new inputs. In fact, they showed that a single network can even learn a general pattern (corresponding to "dog") from exposure to multiple randomly varied dog exemplars, plus a specific exemplar ("Fido") that is repeatedly presented. Then exposure to a new dog pattern (i.e., the dog prototype plus new random variation) gives rise to the dog pattern in the network's output--in effect the network says "that's another dog." However, presentation of the Fido pattern, perhaps with a small amount of noise added, produces Fido and not just dog on the output. Fido is not just another dog but is represented as a specific individual, even though a new pattern with equal similarity to the dog prototype is simply classified as a dog.
Thus, the network has previously been shown to have the general abilities on which our first two simulations rely. However, in the context of the processing of social information these two simulations have a highly significant implication: A common mechanism can account for the seemingly disparate phenomena of exemplar-based inference and group stereotyping. Existing theories in social cognition generally postulate that these rest on fundamentally different representational formats and processes, such as abstract group-trait associations for stereotypes, and more concrete and complex "personalized" representations for specific individuals. Existing theories also face difficult questions such as when to use each type of knowledge representation or which type has priority when they conflict (Kunda & Thagard, 1996 ; E. R. Smith & Z~irate, 1992) . In contrast, the current model is parsimonious: These simulations show that a common mechanism can reproduce both types of effects. This is because the learning rule can abstract general regularities and ignore random variation while also preserving specific details about oft-encountered patterns. Theorists do not have to choose between exemplar and abstractionist mechanisms, for a single mechanism can both extract general regularities from variable presentations and record the specifics of an oft-encountered individual stimulus pattern. Other connectionist theorists have similarly emphasized the benefits of a single mechanism that can handle behaviors that seem on the surface to involve separate processes using "rules" and "exceptions" (e.g., Seidenberg, 1993) .
Simulation 3: Emergent Attributes From Combining
Knowledge Structures
Current theories of impression formation (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Wyer & Srull, 1989) claim that under normal or default processing conditions, perceivers search for a single schema, stereotype, or other knowledge structure in memory that fits available information about a target person. The schema is then used to direct the search for further information, to make inferences, and to derive affective and evaluative responses. Only special motives push people to go beyond schema-driven processing to personalize or individuate the target by focusing on specific attributes. Recent research demonstrates, however, that people are able to use many sources of knowledge in parallel (Kunda & Thagard, 1996) . They can even combine two or more schemata or stereotypes in creative ways, often producing emergent characteristics not present in the input or in any pattern that directly matches the input. For example, a Harvard-educated carpenter might be assumed to be "nonmaterialistic," an attribute that is not highly salient in either the Harvard or the carpenter stereotypes (Asch & Zukier, 1984; Hastie et al., 1990; Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990) . Such emergent attributes are difficult to explain from the perspective of a schema theory in which the preferred mode of processing is to fit a single schema to each input. Can the connectionist network model account for such findings?
Method
The design of the stereotypes used in this simulation may be thought of as follows. Three stereotypes, each including three attributes, are learned by the network: Stereotype 1: ABC Stereotype 2: DEF Stereotype 3: CFG Now consider how the stimulus pattern ABDE will be processed. A model that applies only a single knowledge structure to interpret new input would activate Stereotype 1 and infer characteristic C or else activate Stereotype 2 and infer F. Perhaps a more flexible model might activate both of these stereotypes and infer both C and E With our model, however, we wanted to test whether the network would be able to draw on all of its knowledge--including Stereotype 3, which has no overlap with the stimulus input--to infer characteristic G as well. In other words, Stereotype 1 permits an inferential link between characteristics A and B in the input and C, Stereotype 2 permits an inference of F from D and E, and Stereotype 3 permits an inference of G from C and E Note that the three stereotypes are not applied in a sequential fashion; all are represented in the same set of interunit connections, so all simultaneously affect the processing of the new input stimulus. To implement this design, we simulated 10 subjects and exposed each to 1,600 patterns in a random order. One thousand formed a general background and had all of their characteristics distributed N[0, .5 ]. Two hundred patterns represented each of the three stereotypes. A distributed representation was used, with each of the abstract attributes (the letters in the descriptions of the previous paragraph) represented by a subpattern of positive and negative activation levels across a given set of three units. Thus, the "prototype" pattern for each stereotype had 9 units with values of +.5 or -.5 (corresponding to the three letters), as well as 31 units with zero values. The two hundred patterns actually presented to the network were constructed by adding random noise with a standard deviation of .5 to each unit of this prototype. As in the abstract specification indicated earlier, the characteristics of the first two stereotypes did not overlap, but the pattern for the third stereotype shared parts with each of the first two stereotypes (the subpatterns corresponding to C and F) and also had a unique subpattern (corresponding to G).
Resul~
The network was tested with a stimulus including the subpatterns corresponding to ABDE (with other units set to zero). We examined the network's output for the unique subpattern corresponding to G of the third stereotype. The three units in this pattern were significantly different from zero in the correct directions ( -, -, +; see Table 1 ). In other words, the network activated the specific subpattern corresponding to attribute G.
Discussion
First, this simulation shows that more than one pattern can simultaneously be represented in the network and used to make inferences. In contrast, the two earlier simulations only required the storage of a single pattern. The information in all three stereotypes is maintained in distributed form in the connection weights (van Gelder, 1991) rather than being represented in discrete, independently retrievable parcels or chunks as assumed in current symbolic theories.
Second, the results show that the network successfully inferred from the input pattern that the subpattem corresponding to G should be present. The specific units involved in this subpattern do not appear in the input stimulus or in Stereotypes 1 or 2. Thus, the network must have activated the first two stored patterns (stereotypes) to infer characteristics C and F for the given input and also must have used the third stereotype to activate these three units corresponding to G. However, this description does not imply that processing is sequential (i.e., first activate Stereotypes 1 and 2 and then Stereotype 3), for all stored knowledge (encoded in the connection weights) actually affects processing simultaneously.
In terms of our example, the performance demonstrated by this network could yield the emergent attribute of nonmaterialistic for the Harvard-carpenter stereotype combination. Say Stereotype 1 represents the Harvard stereotype, with attribute C meaning something like "qualified for a high-paying occupation." Stereotype 2 represents carpenter, with attribute F representing "low paid." Stereotype 3 could represent a general knowledge structure stating that if a person is qualified for a high-paying occupation (C) and is low paid (F), it might be because he or she is nonmaterialistic (G). As this simulation shows, activation of the first two stereotypes by other cues besides C and F may result in the activation of G through the simultaneous use of all three of these knowledge structures. Of course, the combination of multiple knowledge structures can be a complex and creative process involving extensive thought (Asch & Zukier, 1984; E. E. Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane, 1988) , and such processes are not incorporated in our simulations. These results suggest, however, that it is also possible for novel attributes to emerge from conceptual combination through a relatively simple process of memory retrieval and reconstruction, as implemented in an autoassociative network memory.
Recently several theorists have advanced parallel-constraintsatisfaction models in various domains in social psychology (Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993; Shultz & Lepper, 1996) . Like the current simulation, these models are able to apply simultaneously multiple stored knowledge structures to generate inferences rather than selecting a single schema to guide processing. However, they differ from our model in one key respect: All of these models rely on localist (nondistributed) representations in which a node represents a belief or proposition, and connections between nodes represent their relations of consistency or inconsistency. Each of these models uses a structure of nodes and links set up by the theorist for a particular problem. Many decisions must be made: which nodes (propositions) to include as relevant in a problem representation at all, what initial activation levels (belief strengths) to give the nodes, and what sign and weight to give each link. When the proper representations are hand coded in this way, flows of activation in the network according to the models' rules perform parallel constraint satisfaction and yield the desired inferences.
In contrast, the model described here (as is typical of models using distributed rather than local representations) learns, from a series of input stimuli, the representations on which it bases inferences. Our simulations are not free of theoretical assumptions, of course: The specific structure and sequence of the input patterns presented to the network embody our assumptions about regularities in the social environment that are available to be learned by the network. We believe that our model nevertheless has three advantages over localist parallel-constraintsatisfaction models (leaving aside any issues of the neural plausibility of distributed representations). (a) Ours represents a more complete model, covering the construction as well as the use of representations. In contrast, models that require hand coding of their representations deal only with the use of knowledge and leave open questions as to how the representations that are assumed to underlie a given inference can be produced in the first place. (b) Assumptions about the nature and sequence of input stimuli seem more transparent and easier to justify, compared with assumptions about the N starting activation levels and N 2 link strengths in a localist model. (c) Finally, assumptions about the nature of stimulus inputs give rise to testable hypotheses, which could be confirmed in studies of the inputs that people naturally receive or in experimental studies that vary stimulus inputs and test their consequences for memory and judgment. In contrast, assumptions about activations and links of localist nodes are not directly testable in any independent way, other than by through their effects on the system's overall output.
Simulation 4: Accessibility From Recency and Frequency
Not all learned knowledge structures (such as concepts, exemplars, or schemata) have equal effects on the interpretation of a new input. Structures that have been processed frequently or recently generally have larger effects. This property is termed accessibility (Higgins, 1996) . In social cognition, this theoretical conception has been applied to an exceptionally wide range of issues. Priming studies (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) demonstrate that recent exposures to a concept in an irrelevant context can influence the way people interpret later information. Studies of chronic accessibility (e.g., Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988 ) show that people who have used a particular concept frequently in the past are more likely to use it to interpret ambiguously concept-related input information. This simulation is intended to determine whether the connectionist network can not only store and retrieve patterns (as shown by the previous simulations) but also maintain representations of patterns with varying levels of accessibility, qualitatively matching the effects of recent and frequent exposure demonstrated by social psychological research.
Method
We simulated 50 subjects per condition for this topic. (The larger number of subjects was due to our desire to find statistically reliable results for all of our conditions, even those not particularly conducive to memory.) Each simulated subject was exposed to a set of patterns, in which the exact composition differed to form four conditions. Each set of patterns included multiple copies of a particular exemplar, interspersed among a larger number of background patterns. The value of each characteristic in the exemplar was independently drawn from an N[0, .5] distribution. The same exemplar was used in all simulations and was presented without variation. The general background patterns had all of their characteristics drawn from an N[0, .5] distribution. The number and order of presentation varied across conditions (see Table 2 ).
As Table 2 shows, recency was manipulated by presenting the exemplar patterns either followed by 300 additional random patterns or at the end of the stimulus sequence. Frequency was manipulated by presenting either 30 or 150 copies of the exemplar. We tested each network's memory for the exemplar by presenting it with an incomplete version of the exemplar (containing 35 features) and then correlating the network's output on the remaining 5 characteristics with the original exemplar pattern.
Results
The mean r-to-z transformed correlations are presented in Table 3 ; the transformation is used because comparisons among Table 3 are separate comparisons of each condition's mean against a mean of zero, the expected value if no instances of the specific exemplar had ever been encountered.
Discussion
All four conditions yielded results in the predicted direction, though as expected the effect in the not-recent-and-not-frequent condition was small (marginally significant with 50 simulated subjects). The more important results involve comparisons among conditions on the basis of t tests on the r-to-z-transformed correlations. All comparisons discussed here were significant at p < .05. Recency had a clear and strong effect on the magnitude of accessibility, demonstrated by the significant comparisons of Condition 2 versus Condition 1 (effect of recency with only 30 exposures), t(98) = 2.48, and also Condition 4 versus Condition 3 (recency with 150 exposures), t(98) = 12.63.
Frequency also had an effect, which was similar in size: compare Condition 3 versus Condition 1 (effect of 150 vs. 30 nonrecent exposures), t(98) = 2.94, and Condition 4 versus Condition 2 (effect of 150 vs. 30 recent exposures), t(98) = 14.40. One cannot conclude that the model generally predicts that frequency and recency effects will be comparable in size, for the specific effect sizes depend, of course, on such arbitrary details as the numbers chosen to instantiate the various conditions (e.g., 150 vs. 30 exposures; exposures followed by 0 or 300 more random patterns). In general, the simulation results show that the model qualitatively matches patterns of accessibility found with human subjects: recency and frequency both increase accessibility. The connectionist network is able not only to store multiple representations but to maintain them at appropriately varying levels of accessibility, depending on the specific history of stimulus exposures. In this model, accessibility is not explained as some e~tra property (such as position in a storage bin or charge on a storage battery) added on to discrete representational entities. In fact this model does not have any discrete representations in the first place. The relative accessibilities of all the patterns known to the network, in the sense of their respective potentials for activation, are an emergent property determined by the entire set of connection weights. 3 The weights influence the rapidity and precision with which a pattern appears on the network outputs as activation flows, given a related set of input cues. Processing a given pattern changes the weights (through the learning rule) in the direction of making that pattern and similar ones a bit easier to activate. Simultaneously, processing an unrelated pattern makes the original pattern a bit harder to activate because from its perspective random noise is being added to the weights. In this way, the connectionist framework uses an extremely simple and general mechanism to reproduce qualitatively the known aspects of accessibility effects.
Simulation 5: New Prediction of Rapid Recovery of Accessibility After Decay
In the autoassociative model, the current level of accessibility depends on the current values of the connection weights: Specifically, it depends on how well the weights allow flows of activation to reconstruct the entire target pattern, given a subset of the pattern as input. Changes in accessibility due to exposure to new patterns, however, depend on the learning rule and the way the connection weights are altered by newly processed stimuli. Thus, a dissociation between current performance and change due to learning can be predicted. Specifically, two different sets of connection weights may have the same level of accessibility but still change in different ways when the learning rule is applied to new input stimuli.
To visualize how this can occur, think of a particular network (i.e., a specific set of connection weight values) as corresponding to a point on a flat surface. Neighboring points on the surface correspond to very similar networks (formed by very small changes in the connection weights). 4 Each of these networks has a particular value of accessibility for the specific target pattem, which one could measure by feeding in the partial version of the target pattem as input and comparing the network's output to the target. Now consider this accessibility value as defining a vertical distance above the flat plane for each possible network. Areas in which the weights produce relatively good 3 Accessibility has nothing to do with the decay term in the activation equation; decay of activations takes place over short time periods and is independent of the long-lasting changes in the connection weights produced by learning, which are responsible for accessibility.
4 This surface (in actuality, a space with as many dimensions as there are connection weights in the network) is technically called a weight space (see Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992, chap. 3) .
accessibility would correspond to high peaks or plateaus of the resulting "landscape," whereas areas with low levels of accessibility would produce "valleys." A one-dimensional version of this picture is shown as Figure 2 . Note, for example, that the network corresponding to Point B does a good job of reconstructing the target pattern from partial inputs (it has a high value of accessibility). In a picture like this, the operation of the learning rule can easily be visualized: Starting with a set of weights corresponding to a specific spot on the landscape, learning after exposure to an instance of the target pattern changes the weights slightly in a way that moves uphill--toward increased accessibility of the target pattern. In contrast, learning after exposure to a random input pattern moves that current point in a random direction, possibly uphill and possibly downhill. Now, as Figure 2 illustrates, two points (like A and C) may have the same current accessibility level (i.e., the same height in the landscape) but may change in very different ways with further learning. For example, Point A is on a fairly flat portion of the landscape, so many learning trials are required to get very far upward (accessibility will increase only slowly with learning). In contrast, another point at the same level (Point C) may lie on a steep slope, so just a few learning trials will result in a large gain in height (accessibility). Thus, the connectionist model predicts that a dissociation may exist between the current accessibility level and the change in accessibility with further stimulus exposures (for a related prediction, see Hinton & Sejnowski, 1986) .
A concrete test of this prediction may be conducted as follows. Assume that a person is frequently exposed to instances of a specific stimulus concept intermixed with other, irrelevant stimuli. The accessibility of this stimulus should steadily rise, probably with diminishing returns after awhile. Then assume that the person is exposed only to unrelated, random stimuli until the accessibility of the target pattern declines to zero (i.e., there is no longer any detectable tendency to generate the completion of that particular pattern when given a partial version of it as input). Now if the person again begins to encounter that pattern, accessibility should rise again at a faster rate than it did the first time. The reason is that in the initial state, with random connection weights, the network is on average in a fiat portion of the landscape, like Point A in Figure 2 ; accessibility will increase at a relatively slow rate. After accessibility has grown to a high level (e.g., Point B), the decay process (learning many unrelated patterns) effectively adds random numbers to the weights. This will reduce accessibility, eventually to the same level as at first--but it will leave the state of the network at a point like C: near a high peak (the high-accessibility region reached after the initial learning). Thus, further learning can more quickly return the network to a high level of accessibility.
Method
We simulated 100 subjects. First, the network was given 500 random patterns as an initial background (for clarity, we begin counting patterns after this point). Then the network was exposed to 100 learning trials in blocks of 20. Each block consisted of 10 copies of a single pattern (chosen with all units drawn from an N[0, .5 ] distribution) intermixed with 10 random patterns. After each block (i.e., after 0, 20, 40, 60, 80 , and 100 patterns), the accessibility of the target pattern was tested in the usual way. We presented an incomplete version of the pattern (containing the pattern's specific values on 35 of the 40 input units), with learning turned off so that the test had no effect on the connection weights. We measured the network's output on the remaining 5 units and correlated these values with the values of the target pattern. Finally, the correlation was transformed with the r-to-z transformation.
Following the presentation of these 100 patterns, 500 random patterns with no copies of the target stimulus were presented to the network. Accessibility was again tested at this point (i.e., after Pattern 600) to verify that it had returned to zero. Finally, two more blocks like the initial ones (again including the target pattern) were presented, and accessibility was tested after Patterns 620 and 640. The question is whether the increase in accessibility after the decay proceeds at the same rate or more quickly than the increase at the initial trials.
Resul~
The results are shown in Figure 3 . Clearly, the increase in accessibility is much faster after the decay, even though at Trial 600 accessibility was close to zero (virtually identical to the 
Discussion
The network shows rapid recovery of accessibility after a period of decay caused by nonuse of a target pattern. This constitutes a significant new prediction made by our connectionist model, which has not yet been empirically tested. However, similar empirical findings are well-known with dependent variables other than accessibility. For example, explicit memory measures such as recall and recognition generally show savings in relearning; that is, relearning after forgetting proceeds much more quickly than original learning of the same material (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Ebbinghaus, 1885 Ebbinghaus, / 1964 . Still, this pattern needs to be experimentally demonstrated with an accessibility dependent measure. If empirically validated, rapid recovery of accessibility after decay would have important theoretical and practical implications.
In theoretical terms, it constitutes a prediction uniquely generated by this connectionist model and not shared by current theories of accessibility (Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 1989) . These theories treat accessibility as a unitary property. This means that if the level of accessibility is the same under two different conditions (as it is at Trial 0 and Trial 600 in Figure  3 ), then changes in accessibility due to further stimulus exposure would be predicted to be the same as well. In contrast, as outlined earlier, the connectionist model can predict a dissociation between two aspects of accessibility: its current level and its change in response to new stimulus input.
This predicted pattern, if found in experimental work, has important practical as well as theoretical implications. Often people do not wish particular knowledge structures to be accessible. Such structures might include racial and ethnic stereotypes, thoughts about past events tied to feelings of guilt or sadness, and the like. Current theoretical models of accessibility predict that if one can somehow refrain from activating such knowledge structures for long enough, their accessibility would diminish and eventually approach zero. Even though avoiding the thoughts might be difficult in practical terms (Wegner, 1994) , if it can be done then current models promise a lasting decrease in accessibility. Our model paints a less optimistic picture. Even after nonuse leads to a decline to zero accessibility, a few new encounters with the knowledge structure are predicted to pop accessibility right back to (and even above) its previous level. Thus, if this prediction of the model holds true, it will suggest the need for remedies other than the simple decline in accessibility over time (such as the intentional buildup of the accessibility of competing knowledge structures).
General Discussion and Conclusions
Summary and Implications
In summary, the results of these simulations are as follows: The connectionist model can reproduce effects of a frequently encountered exemplar on inferences, effects of a group stereotype learned from varying group exemplars, and effects of recency and frequency on accessibility. Traditional theories in social cognition also explain all of these phenomena. However, to do so, they use at least three distinct types of mechanisms: (a) a schematic abstraction process that summarizes specific observations to produce generic schemata or group prototypes and uses them to make inferences, (b) an exemplar storage and retrieval process, and (c) a special-purpose mechanism attached to each distinct representation (e.g., each schema and exemplar) to track its current level of accessibility. This autoassociative connectionist network is able to simulate all of these phenomena by using only a single mechanism.
The same mechanism also produces effects that current social psychological models do not generally consider: simultaneous use of multiple learned representations (rather than just one) to make inferences and rapid recovery of accessibility after a period of decay. The first of these has already empirically been documented, whereas the second is a novel prediction that awaits confirmation by using accessibility dependent measures (though, as "savings in relearning," the pattern is well-known with memory dependent variables).
Besides its consistency with several known phenomena and its intriguing new prediction, the new connectionist model offers additional advantages. Its account of the learning of representations such as stereotypes from exposure to specific group members is more precise and explicit than current accounts in social cognition, which tend to neglect learning altogether. The connectionist model also avoids difficult questions that tend to remain unanswered in current models, such as the question of when to stop storing individual exemplars and engage a summary or abstraction process instead, and whether to use a group stereotype or a well-known exemplar as a basis for inferences.
McClelland and Rumelhart (1986, pp. 195-205) demonstrated that the same network is also able to reproduce details of several findings in the memory literature, such as repetition priming effects, effects of familiarity on response latency, and effects of exemplar exposures on perceptual identification performance. Thus, the model serves the purpose of theoretical integration, offering a single account for diverse findings that have typically been attributed to separate mechanisms. In comparison to current social cognition models, such as Wyer and Srull (1989) , it also offers a considerable advantage in precision and simplicity. Parsimony and precision, as well as integrative potential--which may allow fruitful investigations of conceptual parallels among phenomena previously viewed as unrelated-are important criteria for evaluation of any theory. Finally, as reviewed by E. R. Smith ( 1996, pp. 901-903) , connectionist models hold much promise in accounting for phenomena like context sensitivity of concepts; multidirectional causation among cognitions like attitudes, beliefs, and goals; and cognition-motivation interactions. For all of these reasons, the type of connectionist model used here would appear to deserve further exploration by social psychologists.
Limitations
Besides its strengths, this particular connectionist model has some limitations. As pointed out, the model can learn a set of patterns perfectly only if the external input to each unit can be predicted perfectly by a linear combination of the activations of all other units, across the entire set of input patterns. Although this is a relatively stringent constraint, several points can be made about it. First, perfect reproduction of learned patterns is not an appropriate goal for a network intended as a model of human memory performance. People cannot remember perfectly; they blend separate memories and display interference from related knowledge even when they are trying to retrieve a specific memory exactly. For example, they may remember only the general characteristics of a group rather than the detailed features of each individual exemplar. In fact, we argue that a memory model that predicted perfect performance under realistic circumstances would be illsuited as a model of human memory.
In addition, modifications to the model can overcome this linearity constraint on pattern learning. Preprocessing of the inputs by other networks can help: If the input features presented to the network are not independently derived from sensory inputs or other sources, but reflect context-sensitive encodings of more basic features, the constraint can be bypassed. Also, the incorporation of so-called hidden units, units without direct connections to the network's inputs or outputs, allows the network to develop its own representations of meaningful features. Without hidden units the network is limited to a fixed set of features (corresponding to the network's inputs) out of which to construct distributed representations. However, hidden units allow the development of features that are flexible and sensitive to the patterning of the inputs in a particular stimulus set. This represents another way to overcome the original model's linearity constraint .
A second limitation of the model proposed here is that it can learn only from frequent repetition of stimulus patterns. A single presentation of a pattern would have little effect on the network's weights. Yet people are evidently capable of one-trial learning. In response to such observations, several theorists (e.g., McClelland, McNaughton, & O'Reilly, 1995; see Schacter & Tulving, 1994) have recently proposed connectionist models involving multiple components, with one network (comparable to the network simulated here) that learns slowly to abstract the statistical structure of the environment (e.g., the central tendency of varying individual group members or the details of a frequently encountered stimulus). Another network using a different learning rule is responsible for rapid learning, focusing particularly on novel and unexpected information, and constructs the episodic memories that are available to consciousness. Independent evidence (both behavioral and neuropsychological in nature) is consistent with this type of distinction between two memory systems, mediated respectively by the neocortex and by hippocampal structures in the brain. As McClelland et al. argued, such a multiple-network architecture can avoid the problems of "catastrophic interference" that have been documented when a single network is subjected to changing task demands. New information can be maintained in a separate fast-learning system and is then gradually and nondestructively integrated into the slow-learning system over time.
Most social psychological theories (in fact, most symbolic models of cognition in general) assume, in contrast, that all knowledge and beliefs are represented in a single memory system. One implication of this assumption is that the beliefs people can consciously access and verbally report are the same ones that guide their preconscious interpretation of their experiences and reconstruction of their explicit memories. This assumption now seems highly questionable (McClelland et al., 1995; Schacter & Tulving, 1994) . Within social psychology there is evidence, for example, that "intuitive" emotional reactions or racial prejudices may be quite independent of verbally reportable knowledge and consciously held beliefs (Devine, 1989; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992) . Further tests of the assumption within social psychology may be spurred by the derivation of distinctive predictions regarding separate memory systems in a connectionist framework.
In fact, some key findings within social psychology may be related to the existence of two separate memory systems. In addition to differences in learning speed and conscious accessibility, the two systems are postulated to differ in the type of information to which they attend (see McClelland et al., 1995) . Schematic learning is chiefly concerned with regularities, so it records primarily what is typical and expected. In contrast, episodic memories should record the details of events that are novel and interesting: In other words, this system should attend more to the unexpected and unpredicted. Social psychological studies (e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979) show that people attend to and recall mostly expectancy-inconsistent information when forming a new impression but that they mostly attend to expectationconsistent information when working with a well-formed and solid expectation (Higgins & Bargh, 1987) . This empirical distinction may be a reflection of more basic differences between two underlying memory systems: one that is consciously accessible, learns quickly, and emphasizes novelty; and one (modeled in this article) that operates preconsciously, slowly accumulates information, and emphasizes regularities. An implication of this suggestion is that researchers would not expect this particular network to be able to simulate such findings as the recall advantage of expectation-inconsistent over expectation-consistent information (Hastie & Kumar, 1979) or contrast effects due to correction following priming (Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990) . This is because both of these effects appear to depend on effortful conscious processing, which is not incorporated in our current simulation (Kunda & Thagard, 1996 , described a similar limitation of their model).
Despite these limitations, the model does reproduce several key phenomena, as described earlier. Autoassociative connectionist networks can be implemented in many ways, and we assume that most of the general properties of this model are probably common to autoassociators in general rather than specific to the details of the model. For this reason, in this article we have focused on demonstrating the model's multiple implications for such phenomena as stereotype learning and use, accessibility, and conceptual combination. We have not yet endeavored to extend this network with additional components (e.g., a fast-learning episodic memory system or a system for consciously controlled processing) to build toward a complete model of human social cognition. In fact, though others prefer such a modeling strategy (e.g., Wyer & Srull, 1989) , we are skeptical of it as an initial approach. In a large and complex model having dozens of assumptions and distinct processing mechanisms, it is often far from clear which parts of the model are responsible for any given prediction and therefore which should be modified when a prediction fails. Our approach in this article has been to demonstrate properties of a single, simple mechanism (an autoassociative network) in order to make the case that implications of connectionist models for social psychology should be more fully investigated. Only as a later step--after the scope of both the successes and failures of predictions developed from this mechanism have become clearer--does it seem wise to modify the network's assumptions or add additional mechanisms to correct the failures.
Conclusion
The development of connectionist models within psychology has been conducted to date largely by cognitive and developmental psychologists concerned with learning, memory, language processing and development, and so on. We hope that social psychologists will begin to take part in this development so that they can assess how well the phenomena that are studied (including social stereotyping, accessibility, evaluations and attitudes, and the like) fit within the connectionist framework. Potentially, social psychologists may help shape connectionist theories to incorporate their insights that cognition is deeply and intrinsically social, depends on social interaction and social influence, and results in motivated behavior in social contexts. These insights will represent important contributions to the future development of connectionist theory.
